Yablo's Study Questions

10–1. What does Yablo identify as the “purpose” of his paper? That is, what does he intend to show? 116b

Yablo intends to show why essentialism requires contingent identity and then how essentialism permits contingent identity.

10–2. Could something be “required” but not permitted? Permitted but not required? Give an example that is not from ethics.

Both of these cases are possible. If they weren’t, then Yablo would be a fool for showing that contingent identity is permitted if essentialism is true. The deontological sense of those words is very different from the sense Yablo wishes to use. An example of the Yablian sense is that it is required that a round square, α, have both the properties of being round and being a square, but it is not permitted that α be round or be a square, because each of those properties excludes the other. Something that is permitted but not required is my attending Ursinus College. I am not metaphysically required, as Joshua Frear, to attend Ursinus, but I am permitted.

10–3. Why, intuitively, is the distinctness of the wax and the bust “essentialism’s problem”? (This requires offering a rough characterization of essentialism.) 116b

Essentialism claims that there are certain properties which are essential to an object. This is usually translated as object α has property P in all worlds in which α exists. There are also properties which are not essential; this is the case in which α has Q in some worlds, but not in others. Given essentialism, we would say that the bust of Aristotle, β, is 1) essentially composed of wax and 2) essentially a depiction of Aristotle. The piece of wax from which β is made is 1) essentially composed of wax but 2) accidentally a depiction of Aristotle. β seems to be simultaneously essentially and accidentally a depiction of Aristotle. This makes no sense. It also makes no sense to suppose that there are two objects in front of us. This is the problem that essentialism creates.

10–4. Give an example of your own of things that are identical and therefore indiscernible. Give an example of your own of things that are discernible (and therefore distinct) through one’s having a property necessarily that the other has only accidentally. 116b

Joshua Frear and Freezer are identical and therefore indiscernible. The 2nd example requested would be one of contingent identity. Take lumpl and Goliath or the bust of Aristotle and the hunk of wax.

10–5. Explain each of the three arguments for thinking that the bust and the wax are not distinct, at least, not in the ordinary sense. Propose a response to each, a defense of their distinctness. 116b–117a

1) The relations between the hunk of wax and the bust of Aristotle are not like the relations between the hunk of wax and the Treaty of Versailles. 2) In this possible world, it just so happens that the hunk of wax and the bust of Aristotle have almost all the same properties. We want a satisfactory answer to why that is so. 3) There is only one object in front of us, not two. R1) Actually, both sets of relations are on the same basis. Generally, we use the same criteria to judge identity and non-identity. R2) There is no satisfactory answer for why. Coincidences often make us look for some deeper reason why they occur, but if there was, then they wouldn’t be coincidences. R3) There are actually two objects in front of us. They just happen to occupy the same location. Once you accept location as a property, you have to be prepared that this might happen in a few cases.

10–6. Why does essentialism require contingent identity?

Without contingent identity, essentialism is committed to claiming non-identity between all sorts of pairs of objects that seem to be identical, like the bust of Aristotle and the hunk of wax.

10–7. What’s the difference between A’s composing B or its generating B or instantiating it or subserving it? Discuss at least two. 117a

An instantiation is a specific instance of an abstract notion. A instantiating B means that A is a specific physical instance of the theoretical idea B. Plato’s doctrine of forms is a clear case of universal instantiation. If C generates D, then any worlds in which D exists, C must also exist. Note that, on this distinction, all instantiations are reverse generations. if A instantiates B, then B generates A. There is no world in which B exists but not A. This is not to say that the reversal works the other way. Instantiations are a subset of reverse generations, not the complete set.

10–8. What is the difference between the complete profile and the complete essence of a thing? Give your own example.

The complete profile is the list of every single property that α has. The complete essence of α is the list of every single property that α must have to be α. Here is a complete profile of α: tetrahedron, small, back of β, front of everything that is not β. The complete essence is: tetrahedron, small. (Although, some might say that there are no essential properties of α).

10–9. How would you rewrite the sentence that begins “A thing does not get to …” (118a line 4) in order to correct the printer’s error?

A thing does no get to be identical with California by having the property of being identical to California, but by having certain other properties.

10–10. What does it mean for one property to be supervenient on others? Give an example.

Iff Q is supervenient on P, Q is present in all cases of P being present and Q is not present in all cases of P not being present, and neither Q causes P nor P causes Q. The classic (although hotly disputed) example is mental properties and brain states.

10–11. Hesperus is Phosphorus (and probably not contingently so—for either Gibbard or Yablo). Hesperus has the property of being identical with Phosphorus. Use this example in contrast with an example of contingent identity to explain Yablo’s view that identity properties ought not to be included in a thing’s essentialist characterization because identity properties are supervenient or dependent. 118a

Lumpl is contingently identical to Goliath. If being necessarily identical to Lumpl is part of Lumpl’s essence, then we enter into a problem. Goliath is not necessarily identical to Lumpl, and so in the case in which Lumpl is contingently identical to Goliath, Lumpl’s essence contains a property which Goliath doesn’t.

10–12. Explain why the essence of the Shroud of Turin is “bigger” than the essence of the Cloth of Turin.

The Shroud of Turin is not the Shroud of Turin without having been the burial shroud of Jesus Christ. This is an essential property. However, the Cloth of Turin is still the Cloth of Turin without having served as the burial shroud of Jesus Christ. Thus, the essence of the Shroud of Turin contains more properties than the Cloth of Turin. This is what Yablo means by “bigger”.

10–13. Explain why the property of being identical with the Cloth is not in the essence of the Shroud.

The essential properties of the Shroud should be plus being the shroud of Jesus Christ. If being identical with the Cloth is one of the essential properties of the Cloth, then surely the identical-ness here is necessary. Then, this means that the Shroud is necessarily identical to the Cloth. However, if two things are necessarily identical, then they should possess the same essences. The essence of the Shroud contains an element that is not present in the essence of the Cloth. Ergo, identity is not in the essence of an object.

10–14. What is the contradiction that is produced if we both include being identical with the Cloth in the Cloth’s essence and suppose that the essence of the Shroud is a matter of adding further properties to those included in the Cloth?

This would mean that the Shroud is necessarily identical to the Cloth. However, necessarily identical objects have the same essence. Thus the essence of the Shroud is the same as the essence of the Cloth. However, the essence of the Shroud includes being the shroud of Jesus Christ, which is not in the essence of the Cloth. The essences are not the same.

10–15. What is a cumulative property? A restrictive property?

A cumulative property is one that does not (except trivially) keep out another property from its substance’s essence. A restrictive property does keep out other non-trivial properties from the essence.

10–16. What is a refinement? 119b–120a

object β is a refinement of object α just in the case that β holds the set of properties Y in its essence, and α possesses Y, but not in its essence.


10–17. Define “recherché.”

Dictionary.com: “Sought out with care; choice. Hence: of rare quality, elegance, or attractiveness; peculiar and refined in kind.”

10–18. What is Yablo’s “coincidence”?

Contingent identity, in which the set of properties Y is held by both α and β, but the modalities of the components of Y are different between α and β.

10–19. What does he mean by—and what is the argument for saying that—“if contingent identity is treated as sameness of contingent properties, contingent identity collapses into identity proper”? 121a

If contingent identity is the sameness of contingent properties, then anything that two things with the same contingent properties are the same thing. In any case, this would reintroduce modality into the content of properties, something Yablo wants to remove.

10–20. Give examples of the various hypothetical properties—i.e. modal, probabilistic, counterfactual and causal—that distinguish the Cloth and the Shroud from one another. Give examples of categorical properties shared by (the coincidentally identical) Cloth and Shroud.

Modal: The Shroud is contingently identical to the Cloth, while the Shroud is necessarily so. Probabilistic: It is highly improbable that a devout Catholic would make a pilgrimage to the Cloth, but fairly probably that a devout Catholic would do so. Counterfactual: The Cloth might not have covered Jesus Christ, but there are no counterfactual situations in which the Shroud did not. Causal: causal properties are the same (unless you assume that the Shroud can, in fact, cause miracle healings).

Categorical properties include being a cloth, being a shroud, and being located in Turin.

10–21. Argue—using an illustrative example—for Yablo’s claim that “among ordinary things, one never finds one thing accidentally juvenile, or mature, and another, coincident with the first, essentially so.” 122a

I cannot think of an example of contingent identity in which one or both of the objects is juvenile or mature. I’m not sure they exist.

10–22. Can there be coincident identities in fiction?

Yes. I could write about lumpl and Goliath in a novel, and it would be very strange if all of the sudden, lumpl and Goliath were not coincidentally identical.

10–23. Are you happy yet?

I will not be happy until I understand the mysteries of the universe, as revealed by the secret doctrines of Metaphysicks and its high priest Roger Florka.

Answers to Gibbard

Here are the answers to Stef's questions on Gibbard's article:

Why does Gibbard stray away from using the words “portion of clay” and instead opts to utilize the words “piece or lump of clay” to flesh out his arguments? (101 (a))

Gibbard stipulates the definitions of “portion” and “piece” to make a distinction he thinks is important. A portion of clay is a bunch of clay particles. A piece of clay is a portion of clay that is lumped together so that it is contiguous.

What does Gibbard state the purpose of his argumentation is on p. 101?

Gibbard’s purpose is to show that there can still be contingent identities if one accepts Kripke’s arguments.

According to the author, what are concrete things?

A concrete thing is an object that is (or would be) found in space.


Define sortal.

No precise definition is given, but sortals seem to be co-extensive with general terms.

Describe in your own words the “rough theory” that develops on p. 104 (a).

The rough theory is that it makes no sense to claim an identity unless the identity is with respect to a certain kind.

Questions for Gibbard article

1. In (1) on p. 100a, what does ◊ stand for?

2. Who is Gibbard setting up as his opponent? What is his oppenent’s view? What is Gibbard’s view?

3. On p. 101b, Gibbard writes “I shall give no exact standard of slowness here, but one might be stipulated if anything hinged on it.” Stipulate an exact standard of slowness.

4. Imagine the situation Gibbard describes on p. 102b where he brings Lumpl into existence before he shapes Goliath. Once he has created Goliath, why is Lumpl = Goliath not the case? They are made of exactly the same components, after all. Also, offer at least one property that Lumpl has that Goliath lacks, or vice versa.

5. What is a sortal? What are the criteria for determining what is a sortal and what is not?

6. According to Gibbard’s sortal theory, which of these identities are necessary and which are contingent? Offer support for your claim, including which sortal the identity is necessary with respect to (if it is necessary).
A. The inventor of the bifocals was the first postmaster general of the USA.
B. Hesperus is Phosphorus.
C. Cicero is Tully.
D. Heat is the motion of molecules.
E*. Pain is a certain brain state.

The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Kinds

Prompt: 500 words on the metaphysics and the epistemology of being something of a certain kind: especially the difference between what it is for something to be an F and how we know it is an F.

This will be interesting for me to answer, given my lack of knowledge of epistemology. First off, there seems to be a distinction made about kinds. Some kinds are simple, and some are complex. A case of a simple kind is if F(x) were to mean “x is a red thing.” A case of a complex kind if F(x) were to mean instead “x is a mammal.” A complex kind can be broken down into the conjunction of several simple kinds. F(x) becomes (P(x) ^ Q(x) ^ … ^ R(x)). In the case of F = mammal, some of the simple kinds are “x is a living thing”, “x is a thing with hair” and so on. We can see already that one way of knowing that x is an F is through our knowledge that x is something of other kinds. Knowing that x is a mammal leads us to knowing that x is a thing with hair, x is a living thing, and so on. In the other direction, knowing that x has all the simple predicates that comprise being a mammal allows us to know that x is a mammal. (Of course, for us to acquire this type of knowledge, we have to know the general proposition that [F(x) <-> {P(x) ^ Q(x) ^ … R(x)}].) Simple kinds are kinds which cannot be broken down into multiple kinds.

What about the metaphysics of simple kinds? I believe that kinds are (like names) tags which are put on similar objects. This tagging requires an intentional being. So in one sense, the existence of kinds is contingent on us (or God, perhaps) being around to group similar objects. However, this presents problems. Even if no intentional beings existed to group objects into kinds, there would still be kinds of atoms. The distinction between carbon atoms and hydrogen atoms is what makes them belong to different kinds, not our perception of the differences. I really don’t have an answer to the question “How is something an F?”. I can answer it in the case of complex kinds, but only by pushing the question back to the simple kinds. There are two answers I can think of: that something is an F if it fulfills the requirements to be an F, or that something is an F if the statement F(x) is true. Neither of these are satisfactory. In fact, the first one begs the question. Epistemologically, we get a similar result: we know that something is an F if we know that F(x) is true. This isn’t satisfactory, either. Of course we know that x is an F if F(x) is true. If the question is merely how we can tell that F(x) is true, then the answer is through the modes of knowledge generally available to us: a priori analyzing and a posteriori investigations. To sum up, I have no clue.

Study Questions (done w/ AJ Davis) - Kripke

5–1. What “rather thick book was written trying to answer the question how synthetic a priori judgments were possible” (72a)?

The Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant, published in 1871.

5–2$. What does “contingent” mean? Give some examples other than identity claims.

Contingent means true only under certain circumstances; not necessarily or universally true. Implying the modality of possibility instead of necessity.
Example: My grade in metaphysics is contingent on my ability to get up before noon.

5–3. What is being substituted for what in getting to (3) on page 72b?

The property “is necessarily identical to x” is substituted for F.

5–4. (A question to keep in mind as you’re reading the paper.) Does Kripke deny that there are any contingent statements? What textual evidence can you find to answer this question?

His view seems to necessitate that identity statements between non-rigid designators are contingent.

5–5*. What is modality de re?

Because of the use of verbs like possible and necessary (also known as opacity verbs) there are situations in which the substitution of singular terms creates statements are not the same semantically (there is not salva veritate substitution). In the case of de re, such situations of substitution arise when a quantifying word occurs outside of the scope of the opacity verb, yet binds a singular term within the scope of the opacity verb. So an example would be:
Someone is such that Sally believes that he is happy.
The quantifying word ‘someone’ is not contained within the scope of the opacity verb ‘believes’, yet the singular term ‘he’ is bound by ‘someone’.


5–6*. Translate into FOL how Russell would understand the contingent identity that “The Postmaster General of the USA is identical with the inventor of bifocals,” using F for being Postmaster and G for being inventor of bifocals.

ExEy(F(x) & G(y) & x = y)

NB - Ex is used for the Existential quantifier, since I can't figure out how to make backwards Es on Blogger.


5–7****. What is the difference between small scope and large scope in Russell’s theory of descriptions? (Cf. primary and secondary occurrences.)

5–8$. What view (whose discussion crosses from 74b to 75a) does Kripke think is true?

The view of Ruth Barcan Marcus that “Identity statements between proper names have to be necessary if they are going to be true at all.”

5–9$. What is the evidence for the (apparent) conclusion that we can make contingent identity statements using ordinary proper names (76a)?

Some identity statements are discovered empirically. Empirical scientific discoveries are contingent; for example, It’s obvious that Hesperus might not have been Phosphorus, and that even now, possibly astronomers are wrong and they are not the same object.

5–10$. What is the reason for thinking that various scientific claims are example of contingent identity statements (76a)?

Scientific claims are the result of empirical studies and not logical proofs. For scientific identity claims like “Heat is the motion of molecules”, there were competing theories about the nature of heat, and one of those might have turned out to be true. It’s a matter of scientific fact that heat is the motion of molecules, and it could have turned out otherwise in another possible world.

5–11$. What explanatory value is the contingency of mind-body identity claims meant to have (76b)?

Identity theorists wish to identify pain with certain material brain states. However, we can conceptually dissociate our pain from these states. I can imagine having pain even when not in a body. The contingency of the identity of the mind with the brain allows identity theorists to explain this. They say that you can imagine that disassociation because the identity is contingent, and in other possible worlds, the mind is not identical to the brain.

Kripke’s view


5–12$. So, what is K´s view (76b)?

All identity statements between rigid designators (essentially proper names) are necessary, even those which are empirically discovered.

5–13$*. Explain the difference between a rigid and a non-rigid designator. Give examples other than those K uses. Be sure to explain what K makes a point of saying he does not mean.

A rigid designator refers to the same object in all worlds which the object exists in. A non-rigid designator can refer to different objects in different possible worlds. The 11th president of Ursinus College is a non-rigid designator. We can imagine counterfactual worlds in which someone else, such as George W. Bush, is the president of Ursinus. (This particular world seems to be Dr. Florka’s nightmare). An example of a rigid designator is John Strassburger. That designator refers to the same object in all worlds where it exists. Kripke explicitly points out that the meaning of the designator must stay the same between possible worlds. The semantic value of the designator must stay the same. There are counterfactual situations in which the phrase “the 11th president of Ursinus College” means, when spoken between people, “the greatest basketball player of all time.” Kripke does not mean to bring in the question of language development into his discussion.

Study Questions - Parsons

1. What does Parsons intend to do in each part of his paper?

He first wants to show that there is a significant difference between empty singular terms and singular terms with nonexistent references. Parsons’ second goal is to revitalize Meinong and create two classes of properties. His final goal is to explain singular terms differently than Russell and then create an alternative logical notation.

3*. Do you accept Parsons’ view of the second conversation, namely, that A grants that what he is referring to does not exist?

Yes, I believe Parsons is correct. Someone might claim, contra Parsons, that A is referring to something that exists: the unicorn-idea. However, Quine has already defused the idea of referring to an idea as being the same as referring to the thing.

4. The argument toward the top of 37b is very simple in form. What is its form?

1. P v Q
2. ~Q
3. Therefore, P.

5. What is Parson’s evidence that we are willing to treat singular terms that appear to refer to fictional and mythological entities as if they in fact do refer?

He has three pieces of evidence: first, we are willing to assert things about fictional and mythological entities. Second, we are willing to use their names to refer back to previous discussions about them. Third, we can’t come up with a way to paraphrase away their names.

8. What is “the prejudice in favor of the actual” (38b)?

The inclination of philosophers to reject the idea of including unreal or impossible objects in their ontology.

10*. On Parsons’ theory how many objects are there? How many actual objects are there?

The number of objects is equal to the combination of all the possible nuclear properties at all string lengths from 1 to the number of all the possible nuclear properties. The number of actual objects is limited to the ones of those that we determine have the extranuclear property of existence.

11. What is it for an object to be complete?

An object is complete if, with respect to every nuclear property, the object has that property, or its negation.

13*. Why are “all existing objects complete”?

Any existing object is complete because we can, at least in theory, examine it to see if it has property p or not. Presumably, the existing object has p or its negation idependently of our observation.

Study Questions - Alston

1. In the quotation given, what does Morton White claim the translations show?

The use of the grammatical structure “There is an x” does not necessitate an ontological commitment to x’s, since we can translate “There is an x” in a way such as to remove that grammatical structure.

2. What does Alston mean by an “existential reduction”?

He means reducing the number of entities we are committed to existing in the universe. In our context, philosophers are attempting to accomplish it through translations. Simply put, existential reduction is shaving with Occam’s razor.

3. What is Alston’s basic argument for saying that the purported existential reduction-translations do not show that we do not need to assert the existence of various troubling entities?

Alston’s argument is this: either (2) is an adequate translation of (1) or it is not. If it’s not, then we need to go back to the drawing board and make a better translation. If it is an adequate translation, then all the meaning in (1) is carried over into (2). All reduction-translations either err on the side of reduction (not all meaning is carried over) or translation (no reduction of entities is made).

5**. Is it possible that two people, one a common cobbler, the other a bearded and avuncular philosopher, should utter precisely the same sentence with one utterance carrying an implication of being about ultimate reality while the other does not? If that’s not possible, why not?

Yes, this is entirely possible. Meaning is encapsulated in propositions and not sentences. Sentences communicate propositions, but they are messy sometimes, and changes in accent and context in a sentence can change what proposition it refers to. Just as x and y could refer to the same proposition, x and x’ could refer to different propositions. Could this happen in the case of reference to ultimate reality? I believe so. What Alston means if he were to say, “There is a possibility that James will come” could be dramatically different than what the cobbler means. Alston could be claiming that possibilities are entities, while the cobbler just means that James might stop by his shop for the shoes he’s been working on. I believe this also accurately sums up Alston’s view on this. Although he doesn’t cover it directly in the paper (and might object to my talk of “propositions”), I believe what I’ve put down here is merely a consequence of his claims on page 47 of his paper.

6. What does Alston mean by “the ontological interpretation”? (p48)

The ontological position is that (2) carries all of the meaning of (1) and so also has ontological import. Translating (1) into (2) does not remove the ontological claim that possibilities are real.

11. What is the difference between an abstract entity and a concrete entity?

I believe that concrete entities are anything that can be located in space-time and abstract entities are all those things that cannot.

14. What according to Alston is the real objection to sentences like “There is a possibility that James will come”? Does translation into another grammatical form eliminate this objection? If it so, how?

The real problem here is a grammatical similarity between the sentence, “There is a possibility that James will come” and the sentence “There is a fruit that James will eat”. We get fooled into thinking that both the sentences have similar propositional structures. The similarity hides the fact that possibilities are fundamentally very different than fruits, and to assume that they are the same type of thing is to make a category mistake. In fact, I don’t think that Alston thinks we can even ask of possibilities if they exist.

15. What is a “category mistake” (p52)? Check Wikipedia and elsewhere.

A category mistake is mentally putting something in an incorrect category and then talking about it that way. According to Wikipedia, the term was first used by Gilbert Ryle to claim that it is a category mistake to talk about the mind as if it were a substance. However, I believe that the concept of a category mistake extends at least as far back as Russell. The main claim of “Existence and Description” (1905) was that philosophers have made a category mistake about existence, believing it to be a predicate.