Yablo's Study Questions
10–1. What does Yablo identify as the “purpose” of his paper? That is, what does he intend to show? 116b
Yablo intends to show why essentialism requires contingent identity and then how essentialism permits contingent identity.
10–2. Could something be “required” but not permitted? Permitted but not required? Give an example that is not from ethics.
Both of these cases are possible. If they weren’t, then Yablo would be a fool for showing that contingent identity is permitted if essentialism is true. The deontological sense of those words is very different from the sense Yablo wishes to use. An example of the Yablian sense is that it is required that a round square, α, have both the properties of being round and being a square, but it is not permitted that α be round or be a square, because each of those properties excludes the other. Something that is permitted but not required is my attending Ursinus College. I am not metaphysically required, as Joshua Frear, to attend Ursinus, but I am permitted.
10–3. Why, intuitively, is the distinctness of the wax and the bust “essentialism’s problem”? (This requires offering a rough characterization of essentialism.) 116b
Essentialism claims that there are certain properties which are essential to an object. This is usually translated as object α has property P in all worlds in which α exists. There are also properties which are not essential; this is the case in which α has Q in some worlds, but not in others. Given essentialism, we would say that the bust of Aristotle, β, is 1) essentially composed of wax and 2) essentially a depiction of Aristotle. The piece of wax from which β is made is 1) essentially composed of wax but 2) accidentally a depiction of Aristotle. β seems to be simultaneously essentially and accidentally a depiction of Aristotle. This makes no sense. It also makes no sense to suppose that there are two objects in front of us. This is the problem that essentialism creates.
10–4. Give an example of your own of things that are identical and therefore indiscernible. Give an example of your own of things that are discernible (and therefore distinct) through one’s having a property necessarily that the other has only accidentally. 116b
Joshua Frear and Freezer are identical and therefore indiscernible. The 2nd example requested would be one of contingent identity. Take lumpl and Goliath or the bust of Aristotle and the hunk of wax.
10–5. Explain each of the three arguments for thinking that the bust and the wax are not distinct, at least, not in the ordinary sense. Propose a response to each, a defense of their distinctness. 116b–117a
1) The relations between the hunk of wax and the bust of Aristotle are not like the relations between the hunk of wax and the Treaty of Versailles. 2) In this possible world, it just so happens that the hunk of wax and the bust of Aristotle have almost all the same properties. We want a satisfactory answer to why that is so. 3) There is only one object in front of us, not two. R1) Actually, both sets of relations are on the same basis. Generally, we use the same criteria to judge identity and non-identity. R2) There is no satisfactory answer for why. Coincidences often make us look for some deeper reason why they occur, but if there was, then they wouldn’t be coincidences. R3) There are actually two objects in front of us. They just happen to occupy the same location. Once you accept location as a property, you have to be prepared that this might happen in a few cases.
10–6. Why does essentialism require contingent identity?
Without contingent identity, essentialism is committed to claiming non-identity between all sorts of pairs of objects that seem to be identical, like the bust of Aristotle and the hunk of wax.
10–7. What’s the difference between A’s composing B or its generating B or instantiating it or subserving it? Discuss at least two. 117a
An instantiation is a specific instance of an abstract notion. A instantiating B means that A is a specific physical instance of the theoretical idea B. Plato’s doctrine of forms is a clear case of universal instantiation. If C generates D, then any worlds in which D exists, C must also exist. Note that, on this distinction, all instantiations are reverse generations. if A instantiates B, then B generates A. There is no world in which B exists but not A. This is not to say that the reversal works the other way. Instantiations are a subset of reverse generations, not the complete set.
10–8. What is the difference between the complete profile and the complete essence of a thing? Give your own example.
The complete profile is the list of every single property that α has. The complete essence of α is the list of every single property that α must have to be α. Here is a complete profile of α: tetrahedron, small, back of β, front of everything that is not β. The complete essence is: tetrahedron, small. (Although, some might say that there are no essential properties of α).
10–9. How would you rewrite the sentence that begins “A thing does not get to …” (118a line 4) in order to correct the printer’s error?
A thing does no get to be identical with California by having the property of being identical to California, but by having certain other properties.
10–10. What does it mean for one property to be supervenient on others? Give an example.
Iff Q is supervenient on P, Q is present in all cases of P being present and Q is not present in all cases of P not being present, and neither Q causes P nor P causes Q. The classic (although hotly disputed) example is mental properties and brain states.
10–11. Hesperus is Phosphorus (and probably not contingently so—for either Gibbard or Yablo). Hesperus has the property of being identical with Phosphorus. Use this example in contrast with an example of contingent identity to explain Yablo’s view that identity properties ought not to be included in a thing’s essentialist characterization because identity properties are supervenient or dependent. 118a
Lumpl is contingently identical to Goliath. If being necessarily identical to Lumpl is part of Lumpl’s essence, then we enter into a problem. Goliath is not necessarily identical to Lumpl, and so in the case in which Lumpl is contingently identical to Goliath, Lumpl’s essence contains a property which Goliath doesn’t.
10–12. Explain why the essence of the Shroud of Turin is “bigger” than the essence of the Cloth of Turin.
The Shroud of Turin is not the Shroud of Turin without having been the burial shroud of Jesus Christ. This is an essential property. However, the Cloth of Turin is still the Cloth of Turin without having served as the burial shroud of Jesus Christ. Thus, the essence of the Shroud of Turin contains more properties than the Cloth of Turin. This is what Yablo means by “bigger”.
10–13. Explain why the property of being identical with the Cloth is not in the essence of the Shroud.
The essential properties of the Shroud should be plus being the shroud of Jesus Christ. If being identical with the Cloth is one of the essential properties of the Cloth, then surely the identical-ness here is necessary. Then, this means that the Shroud is necessarily identical to the Cloth. However, if two things are necessarily identical, then they should possess the same essences. The essence of the Shroud contains an element that is not present in the essence of the Cloth. Ergo, identity is not in the essence of an object.
10–14. What is the contradiction that is produced if we both include being identical with the Cloth in the Cloth’s essence and suppose that the essence of the Shroud is a matter of adding further properties to those included in the Cloth?
This would mean that the Shroud is necessarily identical to the Cloth. However, necessarily identical objects have the same essence. Thus the essence of the Shroud is the same as the essence of the Cloth. However, the essence of the Shroud includes being the shroud of Jesus Christ, which is not in the essence of the Cloth. The essences are not the same.
10–15. What is a cumulative property? A restrictive property?
A cumulative property is one that does not (except trivially) keep out another property from its substance’s essence. A restrictive property does keep out other non-trivial properties from the essence.
10–16. What is a refinement? 119b–120a
object β is a refinement of object α just in the case that β holds the set of properties Y in its essence, and α possesses Y, but not in its essence.
10–17. Define “recherché.”
Dictionary.com: “Sought out with care; choice. Hence: of rare quality, elegance, or attractiveness; peculiar and refined in kind.”
10–18. What is Yablo’s “coincidence”?
Contingent identity, in which the set of properties Y is held by both α and β, but the modalities of the components of Y are different between α and β.
10–19. What does he mean by—and what is the argument for saying that—“if contingent identity is treated as sameness of contingent properties, contingent identity collapses into identity proper”? 121a
If contingent identity is the sameness of contingent properties, then anything that two things with the same contingent properties are the same thing. In any case, this would reintroduce modality into the content of properties, something Yablo wants to remove.
10–20. Give examples of the various hypothetical properties—i.e. modal, probabilistic, counterfactual and causal—that distinguish the Cloth and the Shroud from one another. Give examples of categorical properties shared by (the coincidentally identical) Cloth and Shroud.
Modal: The Shroud is contingently identical to the Cloth, while the Shroud is necessarily so. Probabilistic: It is highly improbable that a devout Catholic would make a pilgrimage to the Cloth, but fairly probably that a devout Catholic would do so. Counterfactual: The Cloth might not have covered Jesus Christ, but there are no counterfactual situations in which the Shroud did not. Causal: causal properties are the same (unless you assume that the Shroud can, in fact, cause miracle healings).
Categorical properties include being a cloth, being a shroud, and being located in Turin.
10–21. Argue—using an illustrative example—for Yablo’s claim that “among ordinary things, one never finds one thing accidentally juvenile, or mature, and another, coincident with the first, essentially so.” 122a
I cannot think of an example of contingent identity in which one or both of the objects is juvenile or mature. I’m not sure they exist.
10–22. Can there be coincident identities in fiction?
Yes. I could write about lumpl and Goliath in a novel, and it would be very strange if all of the sudden, lumpl and Goliath were not coincidentally identical.
10–23. Are you happy yet?
I will not be happy until I understand the mysteries of the universe, as revealed by the secret doctrines of Metaphysicks and its high priest Roger Florka.
Yablo intends to show why essentialism requires contingent identity and then how essentialism permits contingent identity.
10–2. Could something be “required” but not permitted? Permitted but not required? Give an example that is not from ethics.
Both of these cases are possible. If they weren’t, then Yablo would be a fool for showing that contingent identity is permitted if essentialism is true. The deontological sense of those words is very different from the sense Yablo wishes to use. An example of the Yablian sense is that it is required that a round square, α, have both the properties of being round and being a square, but it is not permitted that α be round or be a square, because each of those properties excludes the other. Something that is permitted but not required is my attending Ursinus College. I am not metaphysically required, as Joshua Frear, to attend Ursinus, but I am permitted.
10–3. Why, intuitively, is the distinctness of the wax and the bust “essentialism’s problem”? (This requires offering a rough characterization of essentialism.) 116b
Essentialism claims that there are certain properties which are essential to an object. This is usually translated as object α has property P in all worlds in which α exists. There are also properties which are not essential; this is the case in which α has Q in some worlds, but not in others. Given essentialism, we would say that the bust of Aristotle, β, is 1) essentially composed of wax and 2) essentially a depiction of Aristotle. The piece of wax from which β is made is 1) essentially composed of wax but 2) accidentally a depiction of Aristotle. β seems to be simultaneously essentially and accidentally a depiction of Aristotle. This makes no sense. It also makes no sense to suppose that there are two objects in front of us. This is the problem that essentialism creates.
10–4. Give an example of your own of things that are identical and therefore indiscernible. Give an example of your own of things that are discernible (and therefore distinct) through one’s having a property necessarily that the other has only accidentally. 116b
Joshua Frear and Freezer are identical and therefore indiscernible. The 2nd example requested would be one of contingent identity. Take lumpl and Goliath or the bust of Aristotle and the hunk of wax.
10–5. Explain each of the three arguments for thinking that the bust and the wax are not distinct, at least, not in the ordinary sense. Propose a response to each, a defense of their distinctness. 116b–117a
1) The relations between the hunk of wax and the bust of Aristotle are not like the relations between the hunk of wax and the Treaty of Versailles. 2) In this possible world, it just so happens that the hunk of wax and the bust of Aristotle have almost all the same properties. We want a satisfactory answer to why that is so. 3) There is only one object in front of us, not two. R1) Actually, both sets of relations are on the same basis. Generally, we use the same criteria to judge identity and non-identity. R2) There is no satisfactory answer for why. Coincidences often make us look for some deeper reason why they occur, but if there was, then they wouldn’t be coincidences. R3) There are actually two objects in front of us. They just happen to occupy the same location. Once you accept location as a property, you have to be prepared that this might happen in a few cases.
10–6. Why does essentialism require contingent identity?
Without contingent identity, essentialism is committed to claiming non-identity between all sorts of pairs of objects that seem to be identical, like the bust of Aristotle and the hunk of wax.
10–7. What’s the difference between A’s composing B or its generating B or instantiating it or subserving it? Discuss at least two. 117a
An instantiation is a specific instance of an abstract notion. A instantiating B means that A is a specific physical instance of the theoretical idea B. Plato’s doctrine of forms is a clear case of universal instantiation. If C generates D, then any worlds in which D exists, C must also exist. Note that, on this distinction, all instantiations are reverse generations. if A instantiates B, then B generates A. There is no world in which B exists but not A. This is not to say that the reversal works the other way. Instantiations are a subset of reverse generations, not the complete set.
10–8. What is the difference between the complete profile and the complete essence of a thing? Give your own example.
The complete profile is the list of every single property that α has. The complete essence of α is the list of every single property that α must have to be α. Here is a complete profile of α: tetrahedron, small, back of β, front of everything that is not β. The complete essence is: tetrahedron, small. (Although, some might say that there are no essential properties of α).
10–9. How would you rewrite the sentence that begins “A thing does not get to …” (118a line 4) in order to correct the printer’s error?
A thing does no get to be identical with California by having the property of being identical to California, but by having certain other properties.
10–10. What does it mean for one property to be supervenient on others? Give an example.
Iff Q is supervenient on P, Q is present in all cases of P being present and Q is not present in all cases of P not being present, and neither Q causes P nor P causes Q. The classic (although hotly disputed) example is mental properties and brain states.
10–11. Hesperus is Phosphorus (and probably not contingently so—for either Gibbard or Yablo). Hesperus has the property of being identical with Phosphorus. Use this example in contrast with an example of contingent identity to explain Yablo’s view that identity properties ought not to be included in a thing’s essentialist characterization because identity properties are supervenient or dependent. 118a
Lumpl is contingently identical to Goliath. If being necessarily identical to Lumpl is part of Lumpl’s essence, then we enter into a problem. Goliath is not necessarily identical to Lumpl, and so in the case in which Lumpl is contingently identical to Goliath, Lumpl’s essence contains a property which Goliath doesn’t.
10–12. Explain why the essence of the Shroud of Turin is “bigger” than the essence of the Cloth of Turin.
The Shroud of Turin is not the Shroud of Turin without having been the burial shroud of Jesus Christ. This is an essential property. However, the Cloth of Turin is still the Cloth of Turin without having served as the burial shroud of Jesus Christ. Thus, the essence of the Shroud of Turin contains more properties than the Cloth of Turin. This is what Yablo means by “bigger”.
10–13. Explain why the property of being identical with the Cloth is not in the essence of the Shroud.
The essential properties of the Shroud should be
10–14. What is the contradiction that is produced if we both include being identical with the Cloth in the Cloth’s essence and suppose that the essence of the Shroud is a matter of adding further properties to those included in the Cloth?
This would mean that the Shroud is necessarily identical to the Cloth. However, necessarily identical objects have the same essence. Thus the essence of the Shroud is the same as the essence of the Cloth. However, the essence of the Shroud includes being the shroud of Jesus Christ, which is not in the essence of the Cloth. The essences are not the same.
10–15. What is a cumulative property? A restrictive property?
A cumulative property is one that does not (except trivially) keep out another property from its substance’s essence. A restrictive property does keep out other non-trivial properties from the essence.
10–16. What is a refinement? 119b–120a
object β is a refinement of object α just in the case that β holds the set of properties Y in its essence, and α possesses Y, but not in its essence.
10–17. Define “recherché.”
Dictionary.com: “Sought out with care; choice. Hence: of rare quality, elegance, or attractiveness; peculiar and refined in kind.”
10–18. What is Yablo’s “coincidence”?
Contingent identity, in which the set of properties Y is held by both α and β, but the modalities of the components of Y are different between α and β.
10–19. What does he mean by—and what is the argument for saying that—“if contingent identity is treated as sameness of contingent properties, contingent identity collapses into identity proper”? 121a
If contingent identity is the sameness of contingent properties, then anything that two things with the same contingent properties are the same thing. In any case, this would reintroduce modality into the content of properties, something Yablo wants to remove.
10–20. Give examples of the various hypothetical properties—i.e. modal, probabilistic, counterfactual and causal—that distinguish the Cloth and the Shroud from one another. Give examples of categorical properties shared by (the coincidentally identical) Cloth and Shroud.
Modal: The Shroud is contingently identical to the Cloth, while the Shroud is necessarily so. Probabilistic: It is highly improbable that a devout Catholic would make a pilgrimage to the Cloth, but fairly probably that a devout Catholic would do so. Counterfactual: The Cloth might not have covered Jesus Christ, but there are no counterfactual situations in which the Shroud did not. Causal: causal properties are the same (unless you assume that the Shroud can, in fact, cause miracle healings).
Categorical properties include being a cloth, being a shroud, and being located in Turin.
10–21. Argue—using an illustrative example—for Yablo’s claim that “among ordinary things, one never finds one thing accidentally juvenile, or mature, and another, coincident with the first, essentially so.” 122a
I cannot think of an example of contingent identity in which one or both of the objects is juvenile or mature. I’m not sure they exist.
10–22. Can there be coincident identities in fiction?
Yes. I could write about lumpl and Goliath in a novel, and it would be very strange if all of the sudden, lumpl and Goliath were not coincidentally identical.
10–23. Are you happy yet?
I will not be happy until I understand the mysteries of the universe, as revealed by the secret doctrines of Metaphysicks and its high priest Roger Florka.
posted by Joshua Frear at 8:31 AM
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