Study Questions (done w/ AJ Davis) - Kripke
5–1. What “rather thick book was written trying to answer the question how synthetic a priori judgments were possible” (72a)?
The Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant, published in 1871.
5–2$. What does “contingent” mean? Give some examples other than identity claims.
Contingent means true only under certain circumstances; not necessarily or universally true. Implying the modality of possibility instead of necessity.
Example: My grade in metaphysics is contingent on my ability to get up before noon.
5–3. What is being substituted for what in getting to (3) on page 72b?
The property “is necessarily identical to x” is substituted for F.
5–4. (A question to keep in mind as you’re reading the paper.) Does Kripke deny that there are any contingent statements? What textual evidence can you find to answer this question?
His view seems to necessitate that identity statements between non-rigid designators are contingent.
5–5*. What is modality de re?
Because of the use of verbs like possible and necessary (also known as opacity verbs) there are situations in which the substitution of singular terms creates statements are not the same semantically (there is not salva veritate substitution). In the case of de re, such situations of substitution arise when a quantifying word occurs outside of the scope of the opacity verb, yet binds a singular term within the scope of the opacity verb. So an example would be:
Someone is such that Sally believes that he is happy.
The quantifying word ‘someone’ is not contained within the scope of the opacity verb ‘believes’, yet the singular term ‘he’ is bound by ‘someone’.
5–6*. Translate into FOL how Russell would understand the contingent identity that “The Postmaster General of the USA is identical with the inventor of bifocals,” using F for being Postmaster and G for being inventor of bifocals.
ExEy(F(x) & G(y) & x = y)
NB - Ex is used for the Existential quantifier, since I can't figure out how to make backwards Es on Blogger.
5–7****. What is the difference between small scope and large scope in Russell’s theory of descriptions? (Cf. primary and secondary occurrences.)
5–8$. What view (whose discussion crosses from 74b to 75a) does Kripke think is true?
The view of Ruth Barcan Marcus that “Identity statements between proper names have to be necessary if they are going to be true at all.”
5–9$. What is the evidence for the (apparent) conclusion that we can make contingent identity statements using ordinary proper names (76a)?
Some identity statements are discovered empirically. Empirical scientific discoveries are contingent; for example, It’s obvious that Hesperus might not have been Phosphorus, and that even now, possibly astronomers are wrong and they are not the same object.
5–10$. What is the reason for thinking that various scientific claims are example of contingent identity statements (76a)?
Scientific claims are the result of empirical studies and not logical proofs. For scientific identity claims like “Heat is the motion of molecules”, there were competing theories about the nature of heat, and one of those might have turned out to be true. It’s a matter of scientific fact that heat is the motion of molecules, and it could have turned out otherwise in another possible world.
5–11$. What explanatory value is the contingency of mind-body identity claims meant to have (76b)?
Identity theorists wish to identify pain with certain material brain states. However, we can conceptually dissociate our pain from these states. I can imagine having pain even when not in a body. The contingency of the identity of the mind with the brain allows identity theorists to explain this. They say that you can imagine that disassociation because the identity is contingent, and in other possible worlds, the mind is not identical to the brain.
Kripke’s view
5–12$. So, what is K´s view (76b)?
All identity statements between rigid designators (essentially proper names) are necessary, even those which are empirically discovered.
5–13$*. Explain the difference between a rigid and a non-rigid designator. Give examples other than those K uses. Be sure to explain what K makes a point of saying he does not mean.
A rigid designator refers to the same object in all worlds which the object exists in. A non-rigid designator can refer to different objects in different possible worlds. The 11th president of Ursinus College is a non-rigid designator. We can imagine counterfactual worlds in which someone else, such as George W. Bush, is the president of Ursinus. (This particular world seems to be Dr. Florka’s nightmare). An example of a rigid designator is John Strassburger. That designator refers to the same object in all worlds where it exists. Kripke explicitly points out that the meaning of the designator must stay the same between possible worlds. The semantic value of the designator must stay the same. There are counterfactual situations in which the phrase “the 11th president of Ursinus College” means, when spoken between people, “the greatest basketball player of all time.” Kripke does not mean to bring in the question of language development into his discussion.
The Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant, published in 1871.
5–2$. What does “contingent” mean? Give some examples other than identity claims.
Contingent means true only under certain circumstances; not necessarily or universally true. Implying the modality of possibility instead of necessity.
Example: My grade in metaphysics is contingent on my ability to get up before noon.
5–3. What is being substituted for what in getting to (3) on page 72b?
The property “is necessarily identical to x” is substituted for F.
5–4. (A question to keep in mind as you’re reading the paper.) Does Kripke deny that there are any contingent statements? What textual evidence can you find to answer this question?
His view seems to necessitate that identity statements between non-rigid designators are contingent.
5–5*. What is modality de re?
Because of the use of verbs like possible and necessary (also known as opacity verbs) there are situations in which the substitution of singular terms creates statements are not the same semantically (there is not salva veritate substitution). In the case of de re, such situations of substitution arise when a quantifying word occurs outside of the scope of the opacity verb, yet binds a singular term within the scope of the opacity verb. So an example would be:
Someone is such that Sally believes that he is happy.
The quantifying word ‘someone’ is not contained within the scope of the opacity verb ‘believes’, yet the singular term ‘he’ is bound by ‘someone’.
5–6*. Translate into FOL how Russell would understand the contingent identity that “The Postmaster General of the USA is identical with the inventor of bifocals,” using F for being Postmaster and G for being inventor of bifocals.
ExEy(F(x) & G(y) & x = y)
NB - Ex is used for the Existential quantifier, since I can't figure out how to make backwards Es on Blogger.
5–7****. What is the difference between small scope and large scope in Russell’s theory of descriptions? (Cf. primary and secondary occurrences.)
5–8$. What view (whose discussion crosses from 74b to 75a) does Kripke think is true?
The view of Ruth Barcan Marcus that “Identity statements between proper names have to be necessary if they are going to be true at all.”
5–9$. What is the evidence for the (apparent) conclusion that we can make contingent identity statements using ordinary proper names (76a)?
Some identity statements are discovered empirically. Empirical scientific discoveries are contingent; for example, It’s obvious that Hesperus might not have been Phosphorus, and that even now, possibly astronomers are wrong and they are not the same object.
5–10$. What is the reason for thinking that various scientific claims are example of contingent identity statements (76a)?
Scientific claims are the result of empirical studies and not logical proofs. For scientific identity claims like “Heat is the motion of molecules”, there were competing theories about the nature of heat, and one of those might have turned out to be true. It’s a matter of scientific fact that heat is the motion of molecules, and it could have turned out otherwise in another possible world.
5–11$. What explanatory value is the contingency of mind-body identity claims meant to have (76b)?
Identity theorists wish to identify pain with certain material brain states. However, we can conceptually dissociate our pain from these states. I can imagine having pain even when not in a body. The contingency of the identity of the mind with the brain allows identity theorists to explain this. They say that you can imagine that disassociation because the identity is contingent, and in other possible worlds, the mind is not identical to the brain.
Kripke’s view
5–12$. So, what is K´s view (76b)?
All identity statements between rigid designators (essentially proper names) are necessary, even those which are empirically discovered.
5–13$*. Explain the difference between a rigid and a non-rigid designator. Give examples other than those K uses. Be sure to explain what K makes a point of saying he does not mean.
A rigid designator refers to the same object in all worlds which the object exists in. A non-rigid designator can refer to different objects in different possible worlds. The 11th president of Ursinus College is a non-rigid designator. We can imagine counterfactual worlds in which someone else, such as George W. Bush, is the president of Ursinus. (This particular world seems to be Dr. Florka’s nightmare). An example of a rigid designator is John Strassburger. That designator refers to the same object in all worlds where it exists. Kripke explicitly points out that the meaning of the designator must stay the same between possible worlds. The semantic value of the designator must stay the same. There are counterfactual situations in which the phrase “the 11th president of Ursinus College” means, when spoken between people, “the greatest basketball player of all time.” Kripke does not mean to bring in the question of language development into his discussion.
posted by Joshua Frear at 7:02 PM
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