Study Questions - Carnap
1. What do you think an abstract entity is? That is, what does “abstract” mean?
An abstract entity is any entity which does not occupy volume in the space-time continuum.
2. Why do you think empiricists would be more in sympathy with nominalists?
The metaphysical claims of the nominalists fit well with the ontology of empiricism. Empiricists, believing that only observable objects exist, are most likely going to reject the idea of names existing, even if only in the mind (the nominalist claim).
4. What is an internal question of existence, and how do you answer it? Give an example other than those Carnap uses.
An internal question of existence is a question of whether an entity exists within the framework agreed upon. It is answered by using the rules of the framework. For example, “Does an equilateral, equiangular quadrilateral exist?” is answered in the framework of geometry in the affirmative (it’s a square), while “Does a four-sided triangle exist?” is answered in the negative.
5. What is an external question of existence? Does Carnap think it is possible for someone who accepts framework F about g’s to raise external questions about the existence of g’s? Do you think it is possible. Give an example one way or the other.
An external question of existence is a question of whether or not F accurately describes our world, or whether the entities of F actually exist. Not only does Carnap think it’s possible, he believes it’s vital to be able to raise external questions. However, when raising external questions, we question the existence of g’s indirectly. We can question if F matches the universe, which, to answer, requires examining if g’s exist. Carnap wants to be able to internally accept the existence of abstract entities, while maintaining an empiricist ontology. I also believe that it is possible. An example: “The system of physical chemistry is a good instrument for furthering our goals. However, do the entities that physical chemistry tell us exist actually exist? Do bonds, atoms, protons, and quarks actually exist, or are they convenient fictions which provide instrumental value?”
8. What factors according to Carnap influence the non-theoretical, practical decision to accept a “form of language”?
How good the results are we get from adopting it: in essence, it’s instrumental value.
11. Carnap says: “nobody who meant the question ‘Are there numbers?’ in the internal sense would either assert or even seriously consider a negative answer.” Does this go for any internal existence question in any system? Or is it specific to the logical system of arithmetic, or even only for certain questions within the logical system of arithmetic?
I gave an internal question which may be answered in the negative: “Does a four-sided triangle exist?” in answering question 4. Clearly, then, only certain internal existence questions can be answered in the affirmative. Indeed, we would have to suspect the utility of a framework that couldn’t deny the existence of anything: we’d have pegasi and santa clauses galore otherwise.
13. What is a pseudo-question?
A pseudo-question is a question that poses to be a theoretical external question of existence without a clear empiricist approach.
14**. Under what conditions could you meaningfully and informatively aske the question of whether propositions are mental?
There are two conditions where such a question is meaningful: first, inside the frameworks of propositions and the mind (i.e. the internal question). This question, however, is trivial. The case for the interesting version of the question is the external version: what evidence is there for mental states, what evidence is there for propositions, what evidence is there that propositions are mental, and is that evidence sufficient for belief in the mentality of propositions?
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An abstract entity is any entity which does not occupy volume in the space-time continuum.
2. Why do you think empiricists would be more in sympathy with nominalists?
The metaphysical claims of the nominalists fit well with the ontology of empiricism. Empiricists, believing that only observable objects exist, are most likely going to reject the idea of names existing, even if only in the mind (the nominalist claim).
4. What is an internal question of existence, and how do you answer it? Give an example other than those Carnap uses.
An internal question of existence is a question of whether an entity exists within the framework agreed upon. It is answered by using the rules of the framework. For example, “Does an equilateral, equiangular quadrilateral exist?” is answered in the framework of geometry in the affirmative (it’s a square), while “Does a four-sided triangle exist?” is answered in the negative.
5. What is an external question of existence? Does Carnap think it is possible for someone who accepts framework F about g’s to raise external questions about the existence of g’s? Do you think it is possible. Give an example one way or the other.
An external question of existence is a question of whether or not F accurately describes our world, or whether the entities of F actually exist. Not only does Carnap think it’s possible, he believes it’s vital to be able to raise external questions. However, when raising external questions, we question the existence of g’s indirectly. We can question if F matches the universe, which, to answer, requires examining if g’s exist. Carnap wants to be able to internally accept the existence of abstract entities, while maintaining an empiricist ontology. I also believe that it is possible. An example: “The system of physical chemistry is a good instrument for furthering our goals. However, do the entities that physical chemistry tell us exist actually exist? Do bonds, atoms, protons, and quarks actually exist, or are they convenient fictions which provide instrumental value?”
8. What factors according to Carnap influence the non-theoretical, practical decision to accept a “form of language”?
How good the results are we get from adopting it: in essence, it’s instrumental value.
11. Carnap says: “nobody who meant the question ‘Are there numbers?’ in the internal sense would either assert or even seriously consider a negative answer.” Does this go for any internal existence question in any system? Or is it specific to the logical system of arithmetic, or even only for certain questions within the logical system of arithmetic?
I gave an internal question which may be answered in the negative: “Does a four-sided triangle exist?” in answering question 4. Clearly, then, only certain internal existence questions can be answered in the affirmative. Indeed, we would have to suspect the utility of a framework that couldn’t deny the existence of anything: we’d have pegasi and santa clauses galore otherwise.
13. What is a pseudo-question?
A pseudo-question is a question that poses to be a theoretical external question of existence without a clear empiricist approach.
14**. Under what conditions could you meaningfully and informatively aske the question of whether propositions are mental?
There are two conditions where such a question is meaningful: first, inside the frameworks of propositions and the mind (i.e. the internal question). This question, however, is trivial. The case for the interesting version of the question is the external version: what evidence is there for mental states, what evidence is there for propositions, what evidence is there that propositions are mental, and is that evidence sufficient for belief in the mentality of propositions?
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posted by Joshua Frear at 11:47 PM
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