Study Questions - Alston
1. In the quotation given, what does Morton White claim the translations show?
The use of the grammatical structure “There is an x” does not necessitate an ontological commitment to x’s, since we can translate “There is an x” in a way such as to remove that grammatical structure.
2. What does Alston mean by an “existential reduction”?
He means reducing the number of entities we are committed to existing in the universe. In our context, philosophers are attempting to accomplish it through translations. Simply put, existential reduction is shaving with Occam’s razor.
3. What is Alston’s basic argument for saying that the purported existential reduction-translations do not show that we do not need to assert the existence of various troubling entities?
Alston’s argument is this: either (2) is an adequate translation of (1) or it is not. If it’s not, then we need to go back to the drawing board and make a better translation. If it is an adequate translation, then all the meaning in (1) is carried over into (2). All reduction-translations either err on the side of reduction (not all meaning is carried over) or translation (no reduction of entities is made).
5**. Is it possible that two people, one a common cobbler, the other a bearded and avuncular philosopher, should utter precisely the same sentence with one utterance carrying an implication of being about ultimate reality while the other does not? If that’s not possible, why not?
Yes, this is entirely possible. Meaning is encapsulated in propositions and not sentences. Sentences communicate propositions, but they are messy sometimes, and changes in accent and context in a sentence can change what proposition it refers to. Just as x and y could refer to the same proposition, x and x’ could refer to different propositions. Could this happen in the case of reference to ultimate reality? I believe so. What Alston means if he were to say, “There is a possibility that James will come” could be dramatically different than what the cobbler means. Alston could be claiming that possibilities are entities, while the cobbler just means that James might stop by his shop for the shoes he’s been working on. I believe this also accurately sums up Alston’s view on this. Although he doesn’t cover it directly in the paper (and might object to my talk of “propositions”), I believe what I’ve put down here is merely a consequence of his claims on page 47 of his paper.
6. What does Alston mean by “the ontological interpretation”? (p48)
The ontological position is that (2) carries all of the meaning of (1) and so also has ontological import. Translating (1) into (2) does not remove the ontological claim that possibilities are real.
11. What is the difference between an abstract entity and a concrete entity?
I believe that concrete entities are anything that can be located in space-time and abstract entities are all those things that cannot.
14. What according to Alston is the real objection to sentences like “There is a possibility that James will come”? Does translation into another grammatical form eliminate this objection? If it so, how?
The real problem here is a grammatical similarity between the sentence, “There is a possibility that James will come” and the sentence “There is a fruit that James will eat”. We get fooled into thinking that both the sentences have similar propositional structures. The similarity hides the fact that possibilities are fundamentally very different than fruits, and to assume that they are the same type of thing is to make a category mistake. In fact, I don’t think that Alston thinks we can even ask of possibilities if they exist.
15. What is a “category mistake” (p52)? Check Wikipedia and elsewhere.
A category mistake is mentally putting something in an incorrect category and then talking about it that way. According to Wikipedia, the term was first used by Gilbert Ryle to claim that it is a category mistake to talk about the mind as if it were a substance. However, I believe that the concept of a category mistake extends at least as far back as Russell. The main claim of “Existence and Description” (1905) was that philosophers have made a category mistake about existence, believing it to be a predicate.
The use of the grammatical structure “There is an x” does not necessitate an ontological commitment to x’s, since we can translate “There is an x” in a way such as to remove that grammatical structure.
2. What does Alston mean by an “existential reduction”?
He means reducing the number of entities we are committed to existing in the universe. In our context, philosophers are attempting to accomplish it through translations. Simply put, existential reduction is shaving with Occam’s razor.
3. What is Alston’s basic argument for saying that the purported existential reduction-translations do not show that we do not need to assert the existence of various troubling entities?
Alston’s argument is this: either (2) is an adequate translation of (1) or it is not. If it’s not, then we need to go back to the drawing board and make a better translation. If it is an adequate translation, then all the meaning in (1) is carried over into (2). All reduction-translations either err on the side of reduction (not all meaning is carried over) or translation (no reduction of entities is made).
5**. Is it possible that two people, one a common cobbler, the other a bearded and avuncular philosopher, should utter precisely the same sentence with one utterance carrying an implication of being about ultimate reality while the other does not? If that’s not possible, why not?
Yes, this is entirely possible. Meaning is encapsulated in propositions and not sentences. Sentences communicate propositions, but they are messy sometimes, and changes in accent and context in a sentence can change what proposition it refers to. Just as x and y could refer to the same proposition, x and x’ could refer to different propositions. Could this happen in the case of reference to ultimate reality? I believe so. What Alston means if he were to say, “There is a possibility that James will come” could be dramatically different than what the cobbler means. Alston could be claiming that possibilities are entities, while the cobbler just means that James might stop by his shop for the shoes he’s been working on. I believe this also accurately sums up Alston’s view on this. Although he doesn’t cover it directly in the paper (and might object to my talk of “propositions”), I believe what I’ve put down here is merely a consequence of his claims on page 47 of his paper.
6. What does Alston mean by “the ontological interpretation”? (p48)
The ontological position is that (2) carries all of the meaning of (1) and so also has ontological import. Translating (1) into (2) does not remove the ontological claim that possibilities are real.
11. What is the difference between an abstract entity and a concrete entity?
I believe that concrete entities are anything that can be located in space-time and abstract entities are all those things that cannot.
14. What according to Alston is the real objection to sentences like “There is a possibility that James will come”? Does translation into another grammatical form eliminate this objection? If it so, how?
The real problem here is a grammatical similarity between the sentence, “There is a possibility that James will come” and the sentence “There is a fruit that James will eat”. We get fooled into thinking that both the sentences have similar propositional structures. The similarity hides the fact that possibilities are fundamentally very different than fruits, and to assume that they are the same type of thing is to make a category mistake. In fact, I don’t think that Alston thinks we can even ask of possibilities if they exist.
15. What is a “category mistake” (p52)? Check Wikipedia and elsewhere.
A category mistake is mentally putting something in an incorrect category and then talking about it that way. According to Wikipedia, the term was first used by Gilbert Ryle to claim that it is a category mistake to talk about the mind as if it were a substance. However, I believe that the concept of a category mistake extends at least as far back as Russell. The main claim of “Existence and Description” (1905) was that philosophers have made a category mistake about existence, believing it to be a predicate.
posted by Joshua Frear at 9:57 PM
1 Comments:
In response to 4a-5, I want to press you on the idea that what the cobbler means is the same thing as what he implies in a statement. It seems like a sentence like "I enjoy cabbage" would imply that there is a a kind of entity called cabbage, though this is not what I meant to say. I simply meant that I like cabbage. I'm not sure if I'm being overly simplistic here, but there does seem to be a difference. Also, I'm confused by this idea of accents in a sentence, though I do think I'm with you when you say that meaning is encapsulated in propositions and not sentences. This seems to be the logical conclusion of Alston's argument about translations; when it gets down to it, the proposition or "meaning" is still the same.
Thanks,
Klaus
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