The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Kinds
Prompt: 500 words on the metaphysics and the epistemology of being something of a certain kind: especially the difference between what it is for something to be an F and how we know it is an F.
This will be interesting for me to answer, given my lack of knowledge of epistemology. First off, there seems to be a distinction made about kinds. Some kinds are simple, and some are complex. A case of a simple kind is if F(x) were to mean “x is a red thing.” A case of a complex kind if F(x) were to mean instead “x is a mammal.” A complex kind can be broken down into the conjunction of several simple kinds. F(x) becomes (P(x) ^ Q(x) ^ … ^ R(x)). In the case of F = mammal, some of the simple kinds are “x is a living thing”, “x is a thing with hair” and so on. We can see already that one way of knowing that x is an F is through our knowledge that x is something of other kinds. Knowing that x is a mammal leads us to knowing that x is a thing with hair, x is a living thing, and so on. In the other direction, knowing that x has all the simple predicates that comprise being a mammal allows us to know that x is a mammal. (Of course, for us to acquire this type of knowledge, we have to know the general proposition that [F(x) <-> {P(x) ^ Q(x) ^ … R(x)}].) Simple kinds are kinds which cannot be broken down into multiple kinds.
What about the metaphysics of simple kinds? I believe that kinds are (like names) tags which are put on similar objects. This tagging requires an intentional being. So in one sense, the existence of kinds is contingent on us (or God, perhaps) being around to group similar objects. However, this presents problems. Even if no intentional beings existed to group objects into kinds, there would still be kinds of atoms. The distinction between carbon atoms and hydrogen atoms is what makes them belong to different kinds, not our perception of the differences. I really don’t have an answer to the question “How is something an F?”. I can answer it in the case of complex kinds, but only by pushing the question back to the simple kinds. There are two answers I can think of: that something is an F if it fulfills the requirements to be an F, or that something is an F if the statement F(x) is true. Neither of these are satisfactory. In fact, the first one begs the question. Epistemologically, we get a similar result: we know that something is an F if we know that F(x) is true. This isn’t satisfactory, either. Of course we know that x is an F if F(x) is true. If the question is merely how we can tell that F(x) is true, then the answer is through the modes of knowledge generally available to us: a priori analyzing and a posteriori investigations. To sum up, I have no clue.
This will be interesting for me to answer, given my lack of knowledge of epistemology. First off, there seems to be a distinction made about kinds. Some kinds are simple, and some are complex. A case of a simple kind is if F(x) were to mean “x is a red thing.” A case of a complex kind if F(x) were to mean instead “x is a mammal.” A complex kind can be broken down into the conjunction of several simple kinds. F(x) becomes (P(x) ^ Q(x) ^ … ^ R(x)). In the case of F = mammal, some of the simple kinds are “x is a living thing”, “x is a thing with hair” and so on. We can see already that one way of knowing that x is an F is through our knowledge that x is something of other kinds. Knowing that x is a mammal leads us to knowing that x is a thing with hair, x is a living thing, and so on. In the other direction, knowing that x has all the simple predicates that comprise being a mammal allows us to know that x is a mammal. (Of course, for us to acquire this type of knowledge, we have to know the general proposition that [F(x) <-> {P(x) ^ Q(x) ^ … R(x)}].) Simple kinds are kinds which cannot be broken down into multiple kinds.
What about the metaphysics of simple kinds? I believe that kinds are (like names) tags which are put on similar objects. This tagging requires an intentional being. So in one sense, the existence of kinds is contingent on us (or God, perhaps) being around to group similar objects. However, this presents problems. Even if no intentional beings existed to group objects into kinds, there would still be kinds of atoms. The distinction between carbon atoms and hydrogen atoms is what makes them belong to different kinds, not our perception of the differences. I really don’t have an answer to the question “How is something an F?”. I can answer it in the case of complex kinds, but only by pushing the question back to the simple kinds. There are two answers I can think of: that something is an F if it fulfills the requirements to be an F, or that something is an F if the statement F(x) is true. Neither of these are satisfactory. In fact, the first one begs the question. Epistemologically, we get a similar result: we know that something is an F if we know that F(x) is true. This isn’t satisfactory, either. Of course we know that x is an F if F(x) is true. If the question is merely how we can tell that F(x) is true, then the answer is through the modes of knowledge generally available to us: a priori analyzing and a posteriori investigations. To sum up, I have no clue.
posted by Joshua Frear at 8:35 AM
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