Study Questions (done w/ AJ Davis) - Kripke

5–1. What “rather thick book was written trying to answer the question how synthetic a priori judgments were possible” (72a)?

The Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant, published in 1871.

5–2$. What does “contingent” mean? Give some examples other than identity claims.

Contingent means true only under certain circumstances; not necessarily or universally true. Implying the modality of possibility instead of necessity.
Example: My grade in metaphysics is contingent on my ability to get up before noon.

5–3. What is being substituted for what in getting to (3) on page 72b?

The property “is necessarily identical to x” is substituted for F.

5–4. (A question to keep in mind as you’re reading the paper.) Does Kripke deny that there are any contingent statements? What textual evidence can you find to answer this question?

His view seems to necessitate that identity statements between non-rigid designators are contingent.

5–5*. What is modality de re?

Because of the use of verbs like possible and necessary (also known as opacity verbs) there are situations in which the substitution of singular terms creates statements are not the same semantically (there is not salva veritate substitution). In the case of de re, such situations of substitution arise when a quantifying word occurs outside of the scope of the opacity verb, yet binds a singular term within the scope of the opacity verb. So an example would be:
Someone is such that Sally believes that he is happy.
The quantifying word ‘someone’ is not contained within the scope of the opacity verb ‘believes’, yet the singular term ‘he’ is bound by ‘someone’.


5–6*. Translate into FOL how Russell would understand the contingent identity that “The Postmaster General of the USA is identical with the inventor of bifocals,” using F for being Postmaster and G for being inventor of bifocals.

ExEy(F(x) & G(y) & x = y)

NB - Ex is used for the Existential quantifier, since I can't figure out how to make backwards Es on Blogger.


5–7****. What is the difference between small scope and large scope in Russell’s theory of descriptions? (Cf. primary and secondary occurrences.)

5–8$. What view (whose discussion crosses from 74b to 75a) does Kripke think is true?

The view of Ruth Barcan Marcus that “Identity statements between proper names have to be necessary if they are going to be true at all.”

5–9$. What is the evidence for the (apparent) conclusion that we can make contingent identity statements using ordinary proper names (76a)?

Some identity statements are discovered empirically. Empirical scientific discoveries are contingent; for example, It’s obvious that Hesperus might not have been Phosphorus, and that even now, possibly astronomers are wrong and they are not the same object.

5–10$. What is the reason for thinking that various scientific claims are example of contingent identity statements (76a)?

Scientific claims are the result of empirical studies and not logical proofs. For scientific identity claims like “Heat is the motion of molecules”, there were competing theories about the nature of heat, and one of those might have turned out to be true. It’s a matter of scientific fact that heat is the motion of molecules, and it could have turned out otherwise in another possible world.

5–11$. What explanatory value is the contingency of mind-body identity claims meant to have (76b)?

Identity theorists wish to identify pain with certain material brain states. However, we can conceptually dissociate our pain from these states. I can imagine having pain even when not in a body. The contingency of the identity of the mind with the brain allows identity theorists to explain this. They say that you can imagine that disassociation because the identity is contingent, and in other possible worlds, the mind is not identical to the brain.

Kripke’s view


5–12$. So, what is K´s view (76b)?

All identity statements between rigid designators (essentially proper names) are necessary, even those which are empirically discovered.

5–13$*. Explain the difference between a rigid and a non-rigid designator. Give examples other than those K uses. Be sure to explain what K makes a point of saying he does not mean.

A rigid designator refers to the same object in all worlds which the object exists in. A non-rigid designator can refer to different objects in different possible worlds. The 11th president of Ursinus College is a non-rigid designator. We can imagine counterfactual worlds in which someone else, such as George W. Bush, is the president of Ursinus. (This particular world seems to be Dr. Florka’s nightmare). An example of a rigid designator is John Strassburger. That designator refers to the same object in all worlds where it exists. Kripke explicitly points out that the meaning of the designator must stay the same between possible worlds. The semantic value of the designator must stay the same. There are counterfactual situations in which the phrase “the 11th president of Ursinus College” means, when spoken between people, “the greatest basketball player of all time.” Kripke does not mean to bring in the question of language development into his discussion.

Study Questions - Parsons

1. What does Parsons intend to do in each part of his paper?

He first wants to show that there is a significant difference between empty singular terms and singular terms with nonexistent references. Parsons’ second goal is to revitalize Meinong and create two classes of properties. His final goal is to explain singular terms differently than Russell and then create an alternative logical notation.

3*. Do you accept Parsons’ view of the second conversation, namely, that A grants that what he is referring to does not exist?

Yes, I believe Parsons is correct. Someone might claim, contra Parsons, that A is referring to something that exists: the unicorn-idea. However, Quine has already defused the idea of referring to an idea as being the same as referring to the thing.

4. The argument toward the top of 37b is very simple in form. What is its form?

1. P v Q
2. ~Q
3. Therefore, P.

5. What is Parson’s evidence that we are willing to treat singular terms that appear to refer to fictional and mythological entities as if they in fact do refer?

He has three pieces of evidence: first, we are willing to assert things about fictional and mythological entities. Second, we are willing to use their names to refer back to previous discussions about them. Third, we can’t come up with a way to paraphrase away their names.

8. What is “the prejudice in favor of the actual” (38b)?

The inclination of philosophers to reject the idea of including unreal or impossible objects in their ontology.

10*. On Parsons’ theory how many objects are there? How many actual objects are there?

The number of objects is equal to the combination of all the possible nuclear properties at all string lengths from 1 to the number of all the possible nuclear properties. The number of actual objects is limited to the ones of those that we determine have the extranuclear property of existence.

11. What is it for an object to be complete?

An object is complete if, with respect to every nuclear property, the object has that property, or its negation.

13*. Why are “all existing objects complete”?

Any existing object is complete because we can, at least in theory, examine it to see if it has property p or not. Presumably, the existing object has p or its negation idependently of our observation.

Study Questions - Alston

1. In the quotation given, what does Morton White claim the translations show?

The use of the grammatical structure “There is an x” does not necessitate an ontological commitment to x’s, since we can translate “There is an x” in a way such as to remove that grammatical structure.

2. What does Alston mean by an “existential reduction”?

He means reducing the number of entities we are committed to existing in the universe. In our context, philosophers are attempting to accomplish it through translations. Simply put, existential reduction is shaving with Occam’s razor.

3. What is Alston’s basic argument for saying that the purported existential reduction-translations do not show that we do not need to assert the existence of various troubling entities?

Alston’s argument is this: either (2) is an adequate translation of (1) or it is not. If it’s not, then we need to go back to the drawing board and make a better translation. If it is an adequate translation, then all the meaning in (1) is carried over into (2). All reduction-translations either err on the side of reduction (not all meaning is carried over) or translation (no reduction of entities is made).

5**. Is it possible that two people, one a common cobbler, the other a bearded and avuncular philosopher, should utter precisely the same sentence with one utterance carrying an implication of being about ultimate reality while the other does not? If that’s not possible, why not?

Yes, this is entirely possible. Meaning is encapsulated in propositions and not sentences. Sentences communicate propositions, but they are messy sometimes, and changes in accent and context in a sentence can change what proposition it refers to. Just as x and y could refer to the same proposition, x and x’ could refer to different propositions. Could this happen in the case of reference to ultimate reality? I believe so. What Alston means if he were to say, “There is a possibility that James will come” could be dramatically different than what the cobbler means. Alston could be claiming that possibilities are entities, while the cobbler just means that James might stop by his shop for the shoes he’s been working on. I believe this also accurately sums up Alston’s view on this. Although he doesn’t cover it directly in the paper (and might object to my talk of “propositions”), I believe what I’ve put down here is merely a consequence of his claims on page 47 of his paper.

6. What does Alston mean by “the ontological interpretation”? (p48)

The ontological position is that (2) carries all of the meaning of (1) and so also has ontological import. Translating (1) into (2) does not remove the ontological claim that possibilities are real.

11. What is the difference between an abstract entity and a concrete entity?

I believe that concrete entities are anything that can be located in space-time and abstract entities are all those things that cannot.

14. What according to Alston is the real objection to sentences like “There is a possibility that James will come”? Does translation into another grammatical form eliminate this objection? If it so, how?

The real problem here is a grammatical similarity between the sentence, “There is a possibility that James will come” and the sentence “There is a fruit that James will eat”. We get fooled into thinking that both the sentences have similar propositional structures. The similarity hides the fact that possibilities are fundamentally very different than fruits, and to assume that they are the same type of thing is to make a category mistake. In fact, I don’t think that Alston thinks we can even ask of possibilities if they exist.

15. What is a “category mistake” (p52)? Check Wikipedia and elsewhere.

A category mistake is mentally putting something in an incorrect category and then talking about it that way. According to Wikipedia, the term was first used by Gilbert Ryle to claim that it is a category mistake to talk about the mind as if it were a substance. However, I believe that the concept of a category mistake extends at least as far back as Russell. The main claim of “Existence and Description” (1905) was that philosophers have made a category mistake about existence, believing it to be a predicate.

Study Questions - Carnap

1. What do you think an abstract entity is? That is, what does “abstract” mean?

An abstract entity is any entity which does not occupy volume in the space-time continuum.

2. Why do you think empiricists would be more in sympathy with nominalists?

The metaphysical claims of the nominalists fit well with the ontology of empiricism. Empiricists, believing that only observable objects exist, are most likely going to reject the idea of names existing, even if only in the mind (the nominalist claim).

4. What is an internal question of existence, and how do you answer it? Give an example other than those Carnap uses.

An internal question of existence is a question of whether an entity exists within the framework agreed upon. It is answered by using the rules of the framework. For example, “Does an equilateral, equiangular quadrilateral exist?” is answered in the framework of geometry in the affirmative (it’s a square), while “Does a four-sided triangle exist?” is answered in the negative.

5. What is an external question of existence? Does Carnap think it is possible for someone who accepts framework F about g’s to raise external questions about the existence of g’s? Do you think it is possible. Give an example one way or the other.

An external question of existence is a question of whether or not F accurately describes our world, or whether the entities of F actually exist. Not only does Carnap think it’s possible, he believes it’s vital to be able to raise external questions. However, when raising external questions, we question the existence of g’s indirectly. We can question if F matches the universe, which, to answer, requires examining if g’s exist. Carnap wants to be able to internally accept the existence of abstract entities, while maintaining an empiricist ontology. I also believe that it is possible. An example: “The system of physical chemistry is a good instrument for furthering our goals. However, do the entities that physical chemistry tell us exist actually exist? Do bonds, atoms, protons, and quarks actually exist, or are they convenient fictions which provide instrumental value?”

8. What factors according to Carnap influence the non-theoretical, practical decision to accept a “form of language”?

How good the results are we get from adopting it: in essence, it’s instrumental value.

11. Carnap says: “nobody who meant the question ‘Are there numbers?’ in the internal sense would either assert or even seriously consider a negative answer.” Does this go for any internal existence question in any system? Or is it specific to the logical system of arithmetic, or even only for certain questions within the logical system of arithmetic?

I gave an internal question which may be answered in the negative: “Does a four-sided triangle exist?” in answering question 4. Clearly, then, only certain internal existence questions can be answered in the affirmative. Indeed, we would have to suspect the utility of a framework that couldn’t deny the existence of anything: we’d have pegasi and santa clauses galore otherwise.

13. What is a pseudo-question?

A pseudo-question is a question that poses to be a theoretical external question of existence without a clear empiricist approach.

14**. Under what conditions could you meaningfully and informatively aske the question of whether propositions are mental?

There are two conditions where such a question is meaningful: first, inside the frameworks of propositions and the mind (i.e. the internal question). This question, however, is trivial. The case for the interesting version of the question is the external version: what evidence is there for mental states, what evidence is there for propositions, what evidence is there that propositions are mental, and is that evidence sufficient for belief in the mentality of propositions?

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Study Questions - Quine

1. What is Occam’s razor? What other names are there for this principle?

Occam’s Razor is the principle that between equally plausible explanations, the simpler should be chosen. This is also called parsimony in science and KISS in everyday life.

2. What is McX’s initial argument? Give a rigorous formulation of it, in a general form (i.e. without referring to the particular case of Pegasus). Which premise in your view is the weakest one – and why?

McX’s argument:
1. If one can talk about x, then x exists.
2. Quine claims x doesn’t exist.
3. If you make a claim including x, then you can talk about x.
4. Quine can talk about x. (3, 2)
5. x exists. (1, 4)

I believe that premise 1 is the weakest. It is clearly the most controversial. Quine wants to talk about Pegasus without committing to Pegasus’s existence. McX replies that we have to be talking about something when we talk about Pegasus, and what would that be, but Pegasus? However, premise 1 commits us to the existence of Santa Claus, Sherlock Holmes, Zeus, and a host of other non-existent figures. For that reason, I believe that it is the weakest.

4*. Description of the imaginary Wyman’s view introduces a short discussion of the use and abuse of the word “exists”. What is the confusion that arises from consideration of space-time? How does it have an impact on the application to or denial of “exist” to the Parthenon, Pegasus, and the cube root of 27? Is this something Quine is accusing Wyman of? If so, how does it lead to Wyman’s view?

Wyman mistakenly thinks that Quine thinks existence applies only to spatio-temporal objects. To remedy this, he suggests that objects Quine thinks don’t exist actually do exist as unactualized possibilities: non-spatio-temporal entities. The problem here is that when we consider the cube root of 27, we are faced with a dilemma without an obvious solution: is the cube root of 27 actualized or an unactualized possibility? For Quine, some things include a spatio-temporal aspect in their description, and some don’t. Quine is accusing Wyman of believing that only objects with dimensions really exist.

10*. Quine wants us to “reprase” ‘Pegasus’ as description, in any way that seems adequately to single our our idea. Is he falling into the confusion, which he earlier criticized, of thinking that people are referring to a “mental Pegasus-idea” (page 4b) when they are talking about Pegasus? If not, what is he saying?

At first glance, Quine does seem to be veering back towards Wyman’s view when he explains the case of Pegasus. However, he does not confuse the Pegasus with the Pegasus idea. Quine’s claim is that Pegasus can be properly translated as something like “The winged horse who came from the neck of Medusa”. The fact that we now have a descriptive phrase throws some for a loop; after all, it does seem that Pegasus has become a set of words or an idea. However, Pegasus the entity is not claimed to be identical with the phrase “the winged horse who came from the neck of Medusa.” Rather, the *name* “Pegasus” is identical with the phrase “the winged horse who came from the neck of Medusa”. If Quine were falling into Wyman’s trap, he would be claiming that the name “Pegasus” is identical to “the idea of the winged horse who came from the neck of Medusa.” Quine, in reality, has kept the attribute of actualized spatio-temporality in his definition (if we grant that winged horses are a type of horse, and all horses have spatio-temporality).

11*. What is the source of the translation of “Pegasus” into a description? How is it justified? Is there a correct translation?

The source of the description of Pegasus is Greek mythology; specifically, the myth of Perseus. This source is justified because (as far as we know) the creation of both the Pegasus-idea and the description of Pegasus is Greek mythology. There is exactly one correct definition of Pegasus, just as there is exactly one definition of every truncated definite description. Our various attempts to define Pegasus will come close in different distances to the actual description, but there is one definition. Evidence for this comes from the fact that we can, in fact, judge translation attempts of “Pegasus” as better or worse. There must be some standard to measure against.

13**. If you’re Quine, are there genuine names? How are they identified?

For Quine, the only names are pronouns, paradoxically enough. On page 9a, he states that “I have shown… that names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell has shown that descriptions can be eliminated. Whatever we say with the help of names can be said in a language which shuns names altogether.” Names are actually real names only when the speaker and hearer have experience with the object named. I would like to find a more charitable reading of Quine, one that includes a priori knowledge, and real names for abstract entities, but the finding of such a reading is beyond my powers.

What can Language Teach us about Existence?

Sources of knowledge of existences seem to be observation and contemplation. Observation can tell us if tigers or unicorns exist; contemplation can tell us if God exists. Language does not seem to be a source of knowledge for existences. It is a man-made creation, and non-physical creations of men do not seem to be able to tell us anything interesting about existence. However, language is not arbitrary. It is a complex code attempting to express our ideas and emotions. For learning about existence, clearly we’re interested in expressing our ideas. By codifying ideas, each step of a theory can be examined separately. Language can’t teach us anything new about existence, but it can help us sort out our ideas about experience. I believe that logic tells us interesting things about existence, and that language is our expression of logic. We use the tool of language to learn about existence from logic.

Russell, Existence and Description, pt. 2

“What is the ‘simple logical mistake’ that metaphysics makes in its traditional treatment of sentences like ‘Homer existed’?”

Traditional metaphysics assumes that, in the claim, “Homer existed”, Homer is a constituent. However, nothing could be further from the truth. If Homer was a constituent of that claim, then it could not be falsified, for, since Homer is a constituent of a phrase, he exists. This can be seen more clearly when we look at the negation of the claim, “Homer did not exist.” The logical form is the same, but (assuming Homer is a constituent), we have a meaningless statement. The claim is that a constituent of the sentence does not exist. But if Homer does not exist, then what in the world is the constituent constituted of?

In reality, the claim “Homer existed” should be translated as “There existed exactly one x who had certain properties, such as being the author of The Iliad and The Odyssey, and being a Greek.” The word “Homer” is not being used as a name, but as a reference for a definite description.

“*What would Russell say about identity statements with two names?”

Russell would (most likely) say that an identity statement with two names is either false, or a tautology. Take “c is f”: if c and f are names for the same object, then we have a tautology. If c and f name different objects, then the claim is false. Nothing metaphysically interesting or meaningful can ever come from an identity statement between two names. That does not preclude “c is f” ever being important epistemologically, or in a proof as a step. (For example, we can imagine it being interesting to find out that Josh Frear is Freezer, or that a step in a proof might involve a=b).

“Is Russell’s claim that “ ‘x is F’ is sometimes true” a temporal claim?”

Russell’s claim is clearly non-temporal. On page 33a, he laments the vulgarity of tense in English verbs. The fact that possibility and necessity are expressed in temporal-sounding language is also a deplorable vulgarity. “ ‘x is F’ is sometimes true” means that for some x, x is F, and for others, it is not. We can attempt to remove temporality by changing the claim to “ ‘x is F’ is true for some, but not all x”. If you are really hung up on the ubiquitous use of temporal language for claims of possibility, I recommend thinking of it this way: imagine a computer running through all the objects in the domain of x, and seeing if they make “x is F” true. In this scenario, temporality is added to the “sometimes”. Of course, this may just confuse the issue even more.

“What is the ‘double denial’ of ‘The present King of France is bald’? Why is there no double denial of ‘Scott is human’ (supposing ‘Scott’ is used as a name)?”

The double denial of the claim ‘The present King of France is bald’ is that there are two conditions that falsify the claim: first, the present King of France may indeed have a full head of curly locks, or second, there may not be a present King of France. It is easy to overlook the second possibility because form of the claim is suspiciously similar to “Scott is human”, to which there cannot be made the rebuttal “Scott doesn’t exist” (assuming Scott is a name). “The present King of France is bald” can be expressed more accurately as “There exists a c such that ‘x is the present King of France’ and ‘x is bald’ are both true when x is c and at least one is false when x is not c.” Now it is easier to see that there are two claims being made, and that either one can be falsified. c could either not be the present King of France or not be bald.

There is no double denial of “Scott is human” because Scott is a name and cannot be denied like a definite description (the present King of France) can. In this claim, “Scott” is being used to refer to an object, and then we are trying to figure out if that object has the property of being human. It is absurd and meaningless to retort “That object doesn’t have that property because it doesn’t actually exist!” Perhaps this can be seen more clearly when the claim is expressed longhand, as in the previous case. “Scott is human” is more accurately, “ ‘x is human’ is true when x is c”, where c is Scott. There is no double denial possible here.

Could we try to write “Scott is human” in the way we did for the previous claim? Let’s try. “There exists a c such that ‘x is d’ and ‘x is human’ are both true when x is c.” We have two claims; the second one is not problematic. It is possible thatc is not human. However, could c not be d? c ≠ d is possible to write and understand, but what does it mean? It means that the object we are examining, c, or Scott, is not the same object as Scott, d, or the object we were claiming to be human. This is complete nonsense. We can now clearly see that there can be no double denial of “Scott is human”.

I hope I didn't muddy the water too much with my first post!